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MINERAL RESOURCES
by
FredN. Diem * and Eric T Laity**

D

URING the survey period, a number of cases were decided regarding
the Texas law of mineral resources. The cases of significance fall into
two categories: those dealing with the entitlements and responsibilities attendant upon the mineral estate, and those dealing with the express and
implied provisions of the mineral lease.
I.

THE MINERAL ESTATE

The significant developments in the jurisprudence of the mineral estate
were a response to the lignite question in East Texas and an interpretation
of the standard of utmost fair dealing in connection with executive rights.
A.

Surface Deposits of Minerals

This year witnessed the second chapter in the battle between surface
estate and mineral estate owners over the ownership of surface mineable
minerals such as coal, lignite, and iron. In Reed v. Wylie ' (hereinafter referred to as Reed II) the Texas Supreme Court corrected, modified, and
attempted to explain its first opinion in Reed v. Wylie 2 (hereinafter referred
to as ReedI). In so doing, however, the court may have created the necessity for a third opinion to explain certain statements in Reed II.
In Reed II the court expressly overruled the surface-destruction rule set
forth in Reed1.3 The rule set forth in ReedI was as follows: "[Tihe surface estate owner must prove that, as of the date of the instrument being
construed, if the substance near the surface had been extracted, that ex'4
traction would necessarily have consumed or depleted the land surface."
The new rule set forth by the court is that when the deposit lies near the
surface, the substance will not be granted or retained as a mineral if the
surface owner proves that any "reasonable method of production" would
destroy or deplete the surface, including methods in existence as of the
date of the litigation. 5 This new rule rescinds the two most rigorous requirements of the previous rule.
* B.S., Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Texas Tech University. Attorney at Law,
Kilgore & Kilgore, Dallas, Texas.
**
A.B., J.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Kilgore & Kilgore, Dallas, Texas.
1. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
2. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
3. 597 S.W.2d at 747.
4. 554 S.W.2d at 172.
5. 597 S.W.2d at 747.
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The first requirement rescinded by the new rule obligated the surface
owner to prove that the only method of removal of the substance was by
surface-destructive methods. 6 The new rule requires only that the surface
owner prove that there exists a "reasonable method of production" that
would destroy or deplete the surface. 7 The second requirement rescinded
by the new rule necessitated that the method of production that would
destroy or deplete the surface be in existence as of the date of the instrument being construed. 8 If this requirement had been retained, it would
have led to further ridiculous battles between experts over the state of the
art of mining decades ago. 9
In addition to revising the surface-destruction rule, the court, in an apparent effort to reduce further the burden of the surface owner in these
disputes, attempted to clarify and expand the "at the surface" rule set forth
in ReedI. In doing so the court has probably created the need for further
explanation of the Reed rules. The rule concerning the burden of the surface owners, as set forth in ReedI, was that if lignite lies "at the surface of
the land," no further proof will be required to establish the title of the
surface owner. '0 In applying the "at the surface" rule, the court in Reed!!
pointed to significant facts relating to the property in question: outcrops of
lignite in a gully on the property and within one-half mile of the property;
the existence of oxidized lignite within seven to eight feet of the surface of
the property; and the existence of hard mineable lignite within twenty feet
of the surface of the property."l The court also recognized that when lignite is exposed to moisture near the surface, it oxidizes and becomes a low
grade lignite, commonly called "smut" or "clinker."' 2 The court noted
that because of this deterioration at the surface, lignite is rarely visible to
persons walking on the surface.13
The court stated that in using the phrase "at the surface" in Reed! it did
not mean "on top of the surface" but instead used the word surface "as
having some depth."' 4 Applying this rule, the court held that the facts in
Reed!! were sufficient to establish that lignite was "at the surface" as a
matter of law.' 5 By holding that it is not necessary that the substance outcrop on the surface of the property in question, but rather that it is sufficient if the substance is at the surface in the "reasonably immediate
vicinity," 16 the Reed!! court further expanded the phrase "at the surface."
Thus, it would appear that if the surface owner can establish that an out6. 554 S.W.2d at 172.
7. 597 S.W.2d at 747.
8. 554 S.W.2d at 172.
9. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Eastland 1980, writ filed); Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
10. 554 S.W.2d at 173.

1i.
12.
13.
14.
15.

597 S.W.2d at 745.
Id.
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 746.
Id.

16. Id. at 748.
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crop exists within approximately17 one mile of the property in question, he
can prevail as a matter of law.
The confusion in the court's opinion is created by a remark immediately
following its discussion of outcrops in the reasonably immediate vicinity.
In the same paragraph the court states: "The same would be true if the
substance had been near the surface. A deposit which is within 200 feet of
the surface is 'near surface' as a matter of law."1 8 There is no explanation
of this language; however, the court does include a footnote that refers the
reader to pages 180-81 of Justice Daniel's dissenting opinion in ReedI.19
In this portion of his dissenting opinion, Justice Daniel argued that if the
substance could be shown to exist "at or near the surface," then the substance should belong to the surface owner as a matter of law. 20 Therefore,
the court in Reed II may be holding that if a substance lies between the
surface and 200 feet below the surface, the substance belongs to the surface
owner as a matter of law, and that in such event the surface owner is not
required to present any proof relating to mining methods. 2' Whether the
court has adopted Justice Daniel's argument is unclear, and further cases
will be required to clarify the court's language with regard to deposits
within 200 feet of the surface.
An appropriate case for clarifying this issue was recently handed down
by the Eastland court of civil appeals. In Moser v. United States Steel
Coro.22 the court, applying the rules set forth in Reed JJ,23 awarded uranium deposits to the mineral estate owners because, as a matter of law, the
only reasonable method of extracting the uranium at the time of trial was
by solution mining, a non-surface-destructive method. 24 In the instant
case, however, the uranium deposits occurred under the subject property at
a depth of 193 feet. 25 If the supreme court in ReedI intended to hold that
deposits lying between the surface and a depth of 200 feet belong to the
surface owner as a matter of law, then the uranium deposits in dispute in
Moser should have been awarded to the surface estate owners. A writ of
error has been filed in Moser,26 giving the supreme court an opportunity to
clarify the point.
Two other cases decided this year offer guidance to attorneys drafting
17. The court pointed out that there was an outcrop within one mile of the property in
question in Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971). 597 S.W.2d at 748. How far from

the property an outcrop can appear and still be within the "reasonably immediate vicinity"
is a question of fact. See id.
18. 597 S.W.2d at 748 (footnote omitted).
19. Id.; see 554 S.W.2d at 180-81.
20. 554 S.W.2d at 181.

21. The court reaffirmed part of its opinion in ReedI to the extent that if the surface
owner can prove title to a substance under the Reed rules, the surface owner owns the sub-

stance at whatever depth it may be found. 597 S.W.2d at 748.
22. 601 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ filed).

23. 597 S.W.2d at 743.
24. 601 S.W.2d at 734.

25. Id. at 733.
26. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (Sept. 13, 1980) (filed Aug. 29, 1980).
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instruments either granting or reserving minerals. 27 These cases indicate
that if the intent of such an instrument is either to grant or reserve all
minerals, regardless of the method that may be used to mine them, the
instrument should expressly track the language of Reed J.28 Such instruments should explicitly state that it is the intent of that instrument either to
grant or to reserve "all minerals lying upon the surface or at any depth and
those minerals which may be produced by open pit or strip minincluding
29
ing."
B. Executive Rights
The nature of the duty owed to owners of nonparticipatory interests by a
holder of the executive right to lease is uncertain. 30 The few cases on the
subject suggest several different standards of care. At one extreme are
cases that hold that the duty of the executive holder borders on that of a
fiduciary. 3' At the other extreme, the holder of the executive right is held
only to a standard of ordinary care and good faith.3 2 An intermediate
under the label of "utmost fair dealing" or
position has been suggested
"utmost good faith."' 33 This position is similar to an ordinary, prudent
landowner test. 34 Under this intermediate view, if an ordinary, prudent
landowner who was not burdened by an outstanding nonexecutive interest
would have acted differently from the landowner in question, and if the
executive's course of action results in harm to the nonexecutive interest,
then the holder of the executive right to lease would be liable. 35 Kimsey v.
Fore,36 a recent case decided by the Beaumont court of civil appeals, supports the intermediate position and lends credence to the proposition that
the standard of utmost fair dealing should be interpreted along the lines of
the ordinary, prudent landowner commentary.
In Kimsey the predecessor in interest to the plaintiffs had purchased a
term royalty from the predecessor in interest to the defendant lessors. The
term royalty was for a period of five years, and thereafter so long as there
27. Sheffield v. Gibbs Bros. & Co., 596 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]

1980, no writ); Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
28. Sheffield v. Gibbs Bros. & Co., 596 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); Riddlesperger v. Creslenn Ranch Co., 595 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. Reed v. Wylie (Reed I),554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977).

30. For a survey of the cases on the subject of the duties incumbent upon the executive,
see 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 339.2 (repl. ed. 1977).
31. See, e.g., Hollister Co. v. Cal-L Exploration Corp., 26 Cal. App. 3d 713, 721, 102
Cal. Rptr. 919, 924 (1972); First Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 169 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1943, writ ref'd) (dictum).
32. See Wintermann v. McDonald, 129 Tex. 275, 286, 102 S.W.2d 167, 173 (1937).
33. See Federal Land Bank v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 788, 791 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 631, 101 S.W.2d 543, 544 (1937); Morriss v. First Nat'l
Bank, 249 S.W.2d 269, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ refd n.r.e.).

34. This similarity is advocated in H.

WILLIAMS

& C.

MEYERS,

supra note 30, § 339.2,

at 209-10.
35. Id. at 210.
36. 593 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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was production from the tract of land in question. At the time of the conveyance of the term royalty, a well was being drilled on the land, which
later produced hydrocarbons from two different sands. The well was subsequently abandoned because of mechanical difficulties, and the lease
under which the well had been drilled expired. The expiration of the lease
took place approximately two years after the conveyance of the term royalty. For one year afterwards, the defendant lessors refused to execute any
of a series of increasingly lucrative leases offered to them by the ultimate
lessees. During the fourth year of the term royalty, the defendant lessors
did execute a lease containing terms that, with one exception, were much
less favorable than the leases previously offered. In the executed lease the
primary term was extended from two years to three years, and the delay
rental per acre was reduced to less than one-twelfth of that offered earlier.
The executed lease, however, effectively insured that no production would
take place on the tract in question until the term royalty had expired. This
delay was accomplished by stipulating that any royalty to be paid with
regard to production under the lease would in no way reduce the lessors'
receipt of a full one-eighth portion of the hydrocarbons produced. If production were begun before the expiration of the term royalty, the lessees
were obligated to pay the term royalty out of their own share of production. With this potential penalty in mind, the lessees began their drilling
operations on the tract adjacent to the Fore tract and refrained from drilling on the Fore tract until after the term royalty had expired. Production
was subsequently obtained from two wells on the Fore tract. Expert testimony established that the lessees had not been reasonably prudent operators in that they had failed to drill first on the Fore tract where a
productive sand was known to be located. 37 A verdict favorable to the
plaintiffs was returned by the jury. The trial court refused to enter judgment upon that verdict, and granted the defendants' motion for judgment
38
non obstante veredicto.
The court of civil appeals determined that the standard of utmost fair
dealing is an implied covenant arising from royalty deeds and is imposed
upon the owners of an executive right to lease. 39 Because the court was not
convinced that the standard of ordinary care and good faith truly characterized the duty incumbent upon the executive owner,40 the court overturned the trial court's grant of the motion for judgment non obstante
veredicto. 4 1 In addition to directing that judgment be entered against the
lessors, the court of civil appeals directed that judgment be entered against
the operator for breach of the implied covenant of reasonable development
37. Id. at 109.

38. Id. at 107.
39. Id. at 111. In support of its conclusion, the court cited Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex.
628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937), and Portwood v. Buckalew, 521 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Tyler 1975, writ refd n.r.e.). 593 S.W.2d at 111.
40. 593 S.W.2d at 112.
41. Id. at 113.
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and against the lessees for inducing breach of a contractual relationship. 42
The criterion for measuring damages is not evident from the court's opinion.
The matter of executive rights was also discussed by the Eastland court
of civil appeals. In Bullard v. Broadwel143 the court held that the defendant's executive right to lease the mineral estate, of which a one-third interest belonged to the plaintiff, did not absolve him from the cotenancy rule if
the defendant executive developed the mineral estate himself.44 Rather
than the one-third of one-eighth royalty that would be owed to the plaintiff
if the property were developed by a lessee, the court ruled that the plaintiff
was entitled to one-third of the hydrocarbons produced from the land less
45
his pro rata share of the reasonable development and marketing expense.
The defendants were of course held entitled to recover all of the reasonable costs of drilling, completing, and operating the well. 46
II.

THE MINERAL LEASE

During the survey period, Texas courts dealt with the subjects of market
value royalty clauses and field-wide drainage.
A.

The Royalty Clause

On October 1, 1980, the Texas Supreme Court delivered its long-awaited
opinion in the case of Exxon Corp. t,. Middleton .47 The case is a significant
contribution to the interpretation of clauses in mineral leases that provide
for a royalty to be computed on the basis of the fair market value of the
hydrocarbons produced under the lease. The Middleton decision puts to
rest two long-standing points of contention regarding such royalty clauses
and makes substantial strides towards solving two other troublesome aspects of fair market value royalty clauses.
The first matter put to rest by the Middleton decision concerns the meaning of the phrase "at the well." The scope of that phrase is of some importance, since a number of the fair market value royalty clauses being
litigated provide for alternate computations of royalty. Such clauses provide that if the hydrocarbons are sold "off the premises," the royalty is to
be computed with reference to their fair market value; if, however, the
hydrocarbons are sold "at the well," the royalty is to be computed with
regard to the monetary proceeds from the sale. One court has held that the
phrase "at the well" refers to the entire field of production, and in so holding has denied arguments of counsel that the phrase is merely complementary to the phrase "off the premises."'48 This interpretation of the scope of
42. Id. at 114.

43. 588 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
44. Id. at 399.
45. Id. at 400.
46. Id.
47. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6 (Oct. 4, 1980).
48. Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ
refd n.r.e.).
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the two phrases would mean that both methods of royalty calculation apply to at least part of the production from a given geological formation.
49
In Middleton, however, the Texas Supreme Court held to the contrary.
The court found the two phrases "off the premises" and "at the well" to be
mutually exclusive, but complementary, terms.50 Therefore, the court reasoned, the phrase "at the well" refers to all hydrocarbons sold on the
leased premises. 5' As a result, if the royalty clause is phrased in terms of
the leased premises, then the fair market value royalty provision would
apply to all production sold off the leased premises, regardless of whether
that production is sold within or without the producing field. Likewise, if
the royalty clause is phrased in terms of the unitized premises of which the
leased tract is simply a part, then all hydrocarbons sold on the unit are
subject to the "at the well" royalty computation and hydrocarbons sold off
the unit are subject to the "off the premises" royalty computation. The
the decision in Butler v. Exxon
supreme court specifically disapproved
53
Corp.52 that had held otherwise.

The second matter laid to rest by the supreme court in Middleton was
the effect of division orders on fair market value royalty clauses. It has
been argued before lower courts that a division order executed by the lessor was an effective amendment to the lease and abrogated any fair market
value royalty clause that the lease might contain.5 4 The supreme court
held that a division order sent by a lessee to its lessor and executed by the
latter had no effect whatsoever on a fair market value royalty clause.5 5
The court gave two reasons for its decision. First, the court stated that, as
between lessors and lessees, it is not generally their intention that a division order should amend an oil and gas lease;56 a division order is customarily executed for the benefit of third parties and it makes no difference in
the entitlements and responsibilities of lessors and lessees, as among themselves. 57 The second reason given by the court is more trenchant: if the
division order was intended to be an amendment to the applicable oil and
gas lease, it was rendered ineffective under general principles of contract
law because it was unsupported by any consideration. 58
In addition to defining the scope of the phrase "at the well" and ruling
on the effect of a division order upon an oil and gas lease, the Texas
Supreme Court also made progress in clarifying the factors that enter into
49. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 8.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
53. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 8.
54. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280, 288 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 363-65
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978), aft'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, and
severed and remandedin part, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6 (Oct. 4, 1980).
55. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 13-15.
56. Id. at 13-14.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 14.
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the computation of the market value of hydrocarbons. The court first
made reference to Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela ,9 in which the court had
ruled that market value was to be determined by examining comparable
sales in relevant markets. 60 The Middleton court repeated the four factors
that might be used to establish comparability: timing; the quality of the
hydrocarbons being sold; the quantity of the hydrocarbons being sold; and
the access of the hydrocarbons to a marketing system. 6 1 Concluding that
the determination of market value ought not to include prices obtained for
interstate sales or prices obtained under long-term contracts entered into
prior to the period of time covered by the litigation, 62 the supreme court
expressly endorsed the method of calculation used by the lessor's expert
witness. 63 The expert witness had chosen as the relevant market area for
the hydrocarbons in contention the Texas Railroad Commission's Districts
Two, Three, and Four, three contiguous districts viewed by the industry as
the relevant market for gas produced along the Texas Gulf Coast. The
expert then took the arithmetical average of the three highest prices, adjusted for the energy value of the gas, paid from quarter to quarter for any
64
quantity of gas sold anywhere in the relevant market area.
Despite this progress in clarifying the Vela doctrine, further court opinions will be necessary. The supreme court's language in its discussion of
interstate gas seems to import unexamined assumptions into the Vela
formula. The court considers interstate gas prices irrelevant to the royalty
computations of the Middleton case because natural gas sold to interstate
users is "not comparable in quality" to natural gas sold to intrastate
users. 65 As is discussed below in connection with First National Bank v.
Exxon Corp.,66 such language seems to confuse the analysis of both the
factor of comparable time in the Vela formula and the possible federal
67
interest that may be present in fair market value royalty cases.
Another helpful contribution of the Middleton opinion that might require further clarification is the matter of pre-judgment interest. In its
opinion, the supreme court declined to award pre-judgment interest to the
Middleton lessors, stating that the amount of damages was not determina59. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
60. Id. at 872.

61.
62.
63.
64.

24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 10-11.
ld. at 11.

Id.

Id. at 10-11.
65. ld. at 11. But see id. at 12, wherein the supreme court states:

Exxon's methods of calculating royalties reflect one market value for gas produced from wells discovered before January 1, 1972 and another market value
for gas discovered and produced after that date. This distinction is inconsistent with our holdings that under the White and Middleton royalty clause gas
is sold when delivered and market value is determined from sales comparable
in time, quantity, quality, and availability of markets. The determination of
market value is not dependent on when the gas is discovered.
66. 597 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ); see notes 72-88 infra and
accompanying text.
67. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 12.
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ble at the outset of the litigation. 68 The reason that damages were not
determinable, the court wrote, was that the method for calculating the
market value of hydrocarbons was uncertain at that time. 69 As the court
writes elsewhere in its opinion that the market value of gas is primarily
within the domain of expert witnesses, 70 the formula for determining market value in any particular piece of litigation would seem to be an object of
contention itself. It would appear, therefore, that pre-judgment interest
will never be awarded in a dispute over a fair market value royalty clause.
The question of how the Texas Supreme Court will interpret fair market
royalty clauses with regard to natural gas sold to interstate users becomes
increasingly important, as various state and lower federal courts consider
the matter with conflicting results. 7' One Texas state court case was de72
cided during the survey period. In First NationalBank v. Exxon Corp.

the El Paso court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
royalties owed to a lessor by virtue of natural gas that had been marketed
through interstate sales were to be determined without regard to the prices
paid for natural gas sold within Texas, and further, without regard to
prices paid for natural gas of a vintage, as determined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, other than the vintage of the gas produced
from the leased premises. 73 In support of its affirmation the court cited
two federal district court cases, 74 which in turn had made two assumptions:
that natural gas sold outside of Texas by a natural gas supplier subject to
federal regulations is a different commodity than natural gas marketed
wholly by means of sales within the state; 75 and that the sense of the word
"market," as used to refer to a set of consumers with a particular trait, is
76
identical to the sense of that word as used to refer to an economic model.
The Vela doctrine77 on its face would seem to require that royalties
computed under a fair market value lease provision be identical in amount
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Compare Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D.

Tex. 1978) (only sales of interstate gas used to determine market value), afdsub nom. King-

ery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980) and Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins, 452
F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (interstate market only relevant market to determine value)
with Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 434 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (market value
established by intrastate sales), rev'd, 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Lightcap v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d I (market value determined by free market prices
without regard to regulated prices), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
72. 597 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ).
73. Id. at 785-86.
74. Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Tex. 1978),
aft'dsub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980); Hemus & Co.
v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
75. Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155, 160 (N.D. Tex.
1978), aff'dsub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980); Hemus
& Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861, 862 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
76. Brent v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 457 F. Supp. 155, 160 (N.D. Tex.
1978), af'dsub nom. Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980); Hemus
& Co. v. Hawkins, 452 F. Supp. 861, 862 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
77. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 872 (Tex. 1968).
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regardless of whether the natural gas is sold to an intrastate customer or to
an interstate customer. 78 The regime of price regulation under which the
lessee might operate, without more, does not govern the relationship between a lessee and its lessor. 79 This would seem analogous to the Vela
doctrine's denial that a long-term contract into which a lessee may have
entered to market its hydrocarbon production binds a third party like the
lessor.80 Furthermore, if the Vela formula for computing fair market
value royalties were interpreted in such a manner that interstate prices
should indeed be taken into account, the Vela doctrine's emphasis on not
using prices obtaining under old, long-term contracts suggests that only the
price of new vintage gas should be used in the Vela computation. 8 1 Thus,
courts holding that the fair market value royalties for interstate gas should
be computed in a manner different from the manner in which the fair market value royalties of intrastate gas are computed must anticipate that the
Texas Supreme Court will likely qualify the Vela doctrine in its application to interstate natural gas. Whether or not the Vela doctrine should be
amended is, of course, a separate question: one that would seem worthy of
express analysis rather than assumptions.
FirstNational Bank v. Exxon Corp. is notable for the dissenting opinion
of Justice Osborn.8 2 In addition to providing a helpful analysis of the Vela
doctrine as it would apply to interstate natural gas, 83 Justice Osborn points
out that the higher royalty costs that would be incurred by lessees if the
Vela doctrine were applied strictly would produce no hardship for lessees
because such costs can be reflected in the federally regulated price. 84 Justice Osborn also writes that a basis other than the Vela doctrine exists for
computing fair market value royalties with regard only to prices obtaining
on the uncontrolled market. 85 He notes that this second basis is the value
of uniformity among the states; the two states that have already concluded
the judicial development of the fair market value royalty for interstate gas
have dictated that prices on the uncontrolled market are the appropriate
criteria for determining fair market royalties for interstate natural gas.8 6 A
final contribution by Justice Osborn is his reminder that classification of
natural gas sold to interstate customers as a different commodity, or as a
commodity sold on a different market, than natural gas sold to intrastate
78. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
79. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 328 (1974), ajg sub nom. Placid Oil Co.
v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973).
80. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 6, 9 (Oct. 4, 1980).
81. See First Nat'l Bank v. Exxon Corp., 597 S.W.2d 783, 788, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1980, no writ) (Osborn, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 787-94.
83. Id. at 789-92.
84. Id. at 791. In support of his conclusion Justice Osborn cites Mobil Oil Corp. v.
FPC, 417 U.S. 283, 328 (1974), affg sub nom. Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.
1973). 597 S.W.2d at 791.
85. 597 S.W.2d at 791-92.
86. The two states are Kansas and Montana. See Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221
Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1,2, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 586
P.2d 298, 301-02 (Mont. 1978).
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customers, is circular in reasoning. 87 The distinction between interstate
and intrastate natural gas is a creation of the law and is not reflected by a
difference in the economic use of the two "kinds" of natural gas. In order
to reach the conclusion that fair market value royalties for interstate gas
should be computed in a manner different from the manner in which fair
market value royalties for intrastate gas is computed, one first must be
willing to conclude that federal interests dictate that royalty owners should
be subject to the federal regulatory regime, a conclusion that would contradict Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC.88 One also must be willing to conclude
that state courts may properly create federal law.
These considerations have received little attention in the various discussions to date on the question of fair market value royalties for interstate
natural gas. Every court, however, must concern itself with these considerations, even if only implicitly. The first concern is in defining the role state
courts may play in formulating the interests of the federal system. The
second concern is in clarifying the extent to which a state court, in developing the common law, should take into account federal interests. Although the relationship between federal and state law is an important
factor, the ramifications of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins8 9 sometimes are
overlooked by counsel in their arguments before state courts. The scholarly writings on the subject have found the question to be a difficult one.
One well-known position advocates that state law should be rather comprehensive in its treatment of local concerns, leaving federal law in an interstitial position, to be applied by either state or federal courts only when,
and to the extent that, the Congress clearly intends. 90 If this is a sound
view of the creation and role of federal interests in state law, then the
Texas Supreme Court could reasonably decide that the Vela doctrine as
applied to interstate natural gas dictates that royalties be computed only
with regard to prices obtaining on the intrastate market. Alternately, if a
cogent argument could be made that federal interests dictate that fair market value lease provisions effectively should be amended when the gas is
committed to the interstate market, then the court could rule that the computation of royalty payments should be made with reference to regulated
pricing only.
B. Implied Covenants
In Amoco Production Co. v. Alexander 9 1 one of the Houston courts of
civil appeals held that a lessee's duty to protect its lessor's premises from
drainage obligates a lessee not only to protect the leased premises from
87. 597 S.W.2d at 790 (Osborn, J., dissenting).
88. 417 U.S. 328 (1974).

89. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
90. This position may be attributed to Professors Donald T. Trautman and Arthur T.
von Mehren of the Harvard Law School. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW
OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 1036-1120 (1965); Trautman, The Relation Between American
Choice of Law and FederalCommon Law, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 111-26 (1977).

91. 594 S.W.2d 467, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, writ granted).
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drainage by wells on adjacent property, but to protect the leased premises
from field-wide drainage as well. 92 The court also ruled that the duty to
protect against drainage cannot be limited by contract between the parties. 93 The court further wrote that the duty of a lessee to protect its lessor
from field-wide drainage is not ameliorated by the Texas Railroad Commission's spacing rules, if those rules provide for exceptions, and if facts
exist tending94to show that such exceptions would have been granted by the
commission.
The facts of Alexander were especially favorable to the plaintiff. The
defendant lessee held about eighty percent of the leases in the Hastings
West Field of Brazoria County, Texas. The Hastings West Field is an active water-drive field, the producing formation of which rises in elevation
from one end to the other. The Alexander lease was at the lower end of
the formation, with the remainder of the defendant's leases being situated
at the higher end of the formation. Between the Alexander lease and the
other Amoco leases lay leases owned by Exxon Corporation, a major competitor of Amoco Production Company. During the period in question,
Amoco deliberately engaged in a major "plug-back" program to draw as
much of the hydrocarbon reserve from the lower end of the field where the
Exxon leases and the Alexander lease lay, to the higher end of the formation where Amoco would then extract the minerals. 95 The effects of this
plug-back program were two in number, both of which Amoco was aware.
First, Amoco extracted hydrocarbons that otherwise would have been produced from the leases of its competitor, Exxon. Secondly, by extracting
hydrocarbons from the higher end of the formation that otherwise would
have been produced from the Alexander lease, Amoco was able to increase
its share of the proceeds from the sale of those minerals. This was true
because the Alexanders enjoyed a greater percentage royalty than did any
of Amoco's other lessors, all of whom had a uniform royalty provision in
their leases. 96 Amoco, therefore, not only redistributed mineral wealth
among its lessors, but also redistributed potential income from one of its
lessors to itself. The Alexanders repeatedly requested that Amoco rework
the wells on their lease to stem the dramatic fall in hydrocarbon production from their property. Amoco refused.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's award of exemplary damages to the Alexanders, in addition to actual damages. 97 Although the
plaintiffs had brought their action on both contract and tort theories, the
98
appellate court's opinion does not delineate between such theories, nor
does the opinion furnish a basis for an award of exemplary damages other
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 480.
See id. at 471-74.
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than its citation to two rather unusual cases. 99 A legal basis for an award
of exemplary damages might arise from the hybrid nature of implied covenants in oil and gas law. Although clothed in the language of contract,
such implied covenants impose duties that are consonant with conceptions
of tort law. The fact that the duty incumbent upon Amoco could not be
waived by contraco0 would seem to indicate that the implied covenant to
protect one's lessor from field-wide drainage is susceptible to recharacterization as a part of the law of torts.

99. See id. at 479-80. The court cites Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146
Tex. 153, 204 S.W.2d 508 (1947) (facts suggest that consequential damages, rather than exemplary damages, were the actual underlying theory of recovery), and Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ refd n.r.e.) (a case involving fraud on the part of the defendants). 594 S.W.2d at 479-80.
100. 594 S.W.2d at 473.

